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Abstract
The degree of ‘localness’ of candidates, including their residential location, has long
been theorised to influence voters at election time. Individual-level tests of distance
effects in the 2010 British general elections demonstrated that, controlling for
standard explanations of vote, the distance from a voter’s home to that of the
candidate was negatively associated with the likelihood of voting for that candidate.
To test this theory in a sub-national electoral context more likely to produce distance
effects than a national election, this paper builds upon previous analysis by using the
2013 English County Council elections. It improves upon the previous analysis in a
number of ways, analysing an election where ‘localness’ effects would be expected
to be stronger; combining a bespoke YouGov survey of voters with more precise
locational data; including UKIP candidates in its specification; and considering more
closely how voters construe distance. It finds that distance does matter, not only as a
linear measure but also in terms of candidates living in the same or different electoral
division to voters. Finally, the paper simulates the effect of distance on candidate
performances in this type of election to measure its real-world strength.
2Introduction
A growing literature has examined the effect that candidate profiles have on voter
choice (e.g. Johnson and Rosenblatt, 2007; Johns and Shephard, 2008; Campbell
and Cowley, 2014; Fisher et al, 2014). Candidate demographics have been
demonstrated to alter voters’ perceptions of such traits as competence and
trustworthiness, and thereby the likelihood of vote. Similarly, candidates’ origins and
residential location have been shown to influence vote once traditional determinants
have been controlled for (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012; Gorecki and Marsh, 2012).
Most of this recent work has been carried out on national elections. However, older
research into voter geography often focused on local elections (Cox, 1968; Johnston,
1973; Rice and Macht, 1987), and there are good reasons for expecting that
‘distance effects’ – voters assessing competing candidates in terms of their
geographical proximity – should be stronger at the local level. Building on the model
developed for an analysis of distance effects in the 2010 General Election in England,
this paper tests the hypothesis that, other things being equal, voters in the 2013 local
elections for English County Councils will have preferred candidates who live closer
to them.
Why voter distance should matter locally
Previous research into the effect of localism on voting suggests that such influences
would be more likely at local than at national level. For example, Johnston’s New
Zealand study (1973) speculated that effects found in the 1968 Christchurch City
Council election would be less likely to occur at the national level, where party loyalty
should exercise greater effect. Many US studies of proximity on vote have looked at
3sub-national elections, such as gubernatorial races (Gimpel et al, 2008). Work on
presidential elections has focused more on the ‘home-state advantage’ hypothesis,
and its applicability to different territorial aggregations (Garand, 1988; Lewis-Beck
and Rice, 1983). In the British case, qualitative evidence indicates that voters want
local MPs, perhaps above all else, and parties are aware of this (Evans, 2011;
Campbell and Cowley, 2014) but there has been no test of the extent to which
distance or localness plays a role in local elections.
Many of the theoretical arguments extended for both national and local elections do
point to greater relevance for the latter. First, local candidates may be expected to
have a greater vested interest in the community that they are representing. For a
British Parliamentary candidate, for example, the area represented, i.e. the
constituency, is often territorially sizeable – an average of 37,000 hectares.1 Voters
may expect that a representative living in that constituency will be more likely to
represent its interests in more capable and/or committed fashion, given accessibility
and self-interest, but the evidence of direct relevance from MP to voter will be more
difficult to identify across all voters. In a County Council Electoral Division (ED) with
a much smaller territorial size – on average, just over 5,000 hectares – the notion of
a council representative rooted in a single community has greater credibility.
Second, in the British case, the political context of representing a smaller ED
provides a clearer logical connection between voter expectations and candidate
interests than at the constituency level. Whilst MPs will spend a significant proportion
of their time working on national policy issues in Westminster, local councillors will
spend the majority of their time working on issues relevant only to the local authority
area, and in the locality. Furthermore, the possibility of contact between councillor
and voter is greater – and, as Norman et al note, the reform of local councillors’ roles
4in the Local Government Act 2000 has underlined the importance of that councillor-
electorate linkage (2007: 59). Third, then, the ‘personal vote’ theory is highly relevant
to local elections. Direct evidence of retrospective delivery of benefit to the
community, or prospectively, of a capacity to deliver will count in a candidate’s favour.
The ‘constituency attentiveness’ found in general election constituencies (Cain,
Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1984: 115) should transfer to the local election division.
Finally, whatever the link between voter and councillor or council candidate, the
distance hypothesis can only hold if voters are aware of candidate location. In the
General Election test, the candidate’s home address on the ballot papers means this
information is available, but the assumption that voters can parse the location other
than to realise whether it is in their direct locale or not is a large one. Nonetheless,
we found evidence that voters are indeed including the notion of distance in their
vote calculus (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012). This assumption is much less heroic at
the local level, involving smaller and more familiar districts for a voter.
Of course, given the much reduced distances of local election candidates’
residences from any voter in the ED, a counter-hypothesis would be that relative
distance becomes irrelevant – any candidate is likely to be deemed ‘local’.
Compared with General Elections, the qualification criteria for local councillor
candidates in England and Wales are far more stringent, requiring candidates to be
resident in or working in the local authority area in which they wish to stand for 12
months previously.2 Nevertheless, the residency requirements are for the local
authority area – the county, rather than the ED itself. The bounds of variation in
distance are therefore sufficiently large to allow a distance effect to be manifest.
Areas within Electoral Divisions, in the County Council case, will be familiar to voters,
and potentially divisive. Our expectation, then, is that voters are aware of their local
5environment, and will assume, other things being equal, better representation from a
candidate based closer to or in that environment, than one in an adjoining ED or
further afield.
Refining distance analysis in voting
Our analysis of the 2010 General Elections in England provided a first step to
understanding the relationship between voter-candidate distance and party choice at
the individual level (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012). Controlling for political preference,
incumbency and socio-economic context, we found that the distance between voter
and candidate residence did matter. Substantively, the effect was small but
significant. Using the parameter estimates from the conditional logit model in a
simulation of candidate residence locations, we estimated that a much more distant
location for a candidate would cost her between nine per cent (for a Labour
candidate) and 16 per cent (for a Tory candidate).
It is important to look for evidence of this effect in a different electoral context.
Furthermore, the County Council elections of 2013 allow us to improve upon our
General Election test in a number of ways. First, we only previously included
candidates from the three main parties which fielded candidates in all English
constituencies, to provide a consistent choice-set across the country. Arguably, the
United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), a Right-wing Eurosceptic party which
had finished second in the 2009 European election, had established itself as a
national challenger in the 2010 General Election, fielding candidates in 558
constituencies. The saliency of the UKIP campaign on immigration controls, fighting
crime and anti-social behaviour, as well as its continued anti-European rhetoric,
6consolidated its challenge to the Conservative Party in the County Council elections,
winning it 147 council seats, and underlines the need to build upon the three-party
model for 2010, to include UKIP as part of the consistent choice set in 2013. This
does omit a number of EDs where three-party competition – generally an absent
Liberal Democrat or UKIP candidate, but also a number with Labour missing – is the
norm. Evidently we would need to test separate models to confirm that the role of
distance is not dependent upon party supply.
A second constraint was the withholding of residential addresses by a minority of
Parliamentary candidates, invoking the statutory change to the Electoral Law
(Political Parties and Elections Bill, SN/PC/05004).3 For the County Council
elections, there has been no such relaxation of the electoral law – candidates are
required to provide their home address, which is published on the Statement of
Persons Nominated (SoPN) and on the ballot paper.
Third, we were unable to identify the precise location of voter residence using the
British Election study. Only the first cluster of identifiers (the ‘Outward Code’) was
available from the postcode, which denotes a relatively large area. The smallest
locational unit included was the respondent’s electoral ward. Consequently, we used
the ward centroid – the centre of gravity for any geographical polygon – as the best
estimate of their home address. Inevitably this solution introduces error into the
estimation, but with no reason to suspect any pattern to the distance between
centroid and latent home address of voters, this error should be noise, and not
therefore bias our estimates. Nevertheless, this is still error. In the County Council
elections, the survey used to tap relevant voter information, which we discuss in
more detail in the data section below, did include full postcode for each respondent.
Under strict conditions of anonymity and embargo, then, we were able to use this
7postcode together with the candidate postcodes to identify the exact distance
between the two.4
Fourth, UK General Elections are prey to the phenomenon of candidates renting
accommodation in constituencies for the duration of the election, and providing this
as their home address. The location or extent of this practice is unclear, but where
present this might influence a voter’s perception of distance, if they are aware of the
nature of the location, i.e. a rented property rather than ‘true’ residence. In County
Council elections, residency requirements of at least a year mean that council
candidates are unable to move into the area simply for the short term, and the
likelihood of them renting for a sufficient period simply for political reasons, at this
level of governance, is very small. We can therefore be certain of the validity of the
address as long-term residence.
The final improvement we would note relates to the notion of localness, in terms of
understanding its properties, and the counties form an auspicious geographical unit
on which to test this. While driving distance formed a useful first proof of a stable
distance effect in the General Election, it is not the only measurement of distance
which might matter in voting. First, distance in terms of where voters and candidates
live might usefully be conceptualised in terms of a dyadic ‘local or not’ perception,
based upon some notion of geographical locality. In the General Election, the
importance of the driving distance tested with a fractional polynomial suggests that
the relationship was not a blunt ‘either/or’. However, from a territorial point of view,
constituencies are relatively large areas, and to hypothesise that voters would regard
presence or absence from the constituency by a candidate as the crucial distinction
seemed arbitrary. Moreover, empirically, such a distinction would be clearest to
voters in constituencies where candidates withheld their addresses, and instead
8gave their constituency of residence – by definition such voters were not in our
analytical sample. For voters in constituencies where all three candidates gave their
addresses, no constituency information is given per se, only postal address, thereby
relying on voters to be aware of proximity and constituency location.
For County Council elections, however, the EDs are much smaller units, and as we
have noted a candidate for this ED is required to have a formal presence in the local
authority area. We would assume that voters will be more aware of local addresses
and geography, and therefore have a greater sense of addresses being present in
their ED or outside. The extent and precision of this knowledge is unclear, however.
Consequently, in the new model, we use three measurements to test the explanatory
potential of each:
 Home division – does the candidate live in the ED they are contesting or not?
 Contiguity – does the candidate live in the ED they are contesting, a
neighbouring ED or a non-contiguous ED?
 Distance – the Euclidean distance between voter and candidate residences.5
Data and method
Multiple data sources were used to provide the requisite information for this analysis.
Information on voters, including residential postcode, voting behaviour at the County
Council elections, and party thermometer scores to measure party support were
collected piggybacking on ten waves of YouGov’s daily polling survey to its regular
internet panel between 4 and 26 March 2013. From an initial sample of 17194
covering Britain, an analytical sample of 1 354 was obtained once individuals in any
authority other than non-metropolitan counties, voters in redistricted EDs which
9prevented the inclusion of an incumbency control, non-voters, voters for minor
parties or independent candidates, and voters living in EDs with either one or more
of the four main parties missing, or more than one seat up for election, had been
removed.6 The surveys were carried out before the beginning of the official
campaign in order to minimize campaign conditioning of the party thermometer
scores, and then immediately after the election on 2 May to record actual vote.
Candidate information was collected during the two weeks preceding the elections
from the relevant local government websites, where the SoPNs were posted as part
of the Notice of Poll. Incumbency information was collected after the election through
the same websites.
The Electoral Division and county locations of voters and candidates were mapped
using the Ordnance Survey Boundary-Line™ vector shapefile and the Code-Point®
point dataset, which provides eastings and northings for all UK postcodes. Each
voter living in an ED with a council seat contested by candidates from the four
principal parties was then linked to the relevant candidates, and the distance
between them calculated using a simple Euclidean calculation from eastings and
northings for the straight-line distance.7 The maptools and spdep GIS packages in R
were used to calculate the home division dummy and contiguity categorical
measures.
The choropleth map in Figure 1 identifies the 626 EDs in 20 non-metropolitan
counties across which the sample of voters is distributed, and the number of voters
per ED.
--- Figure 1 about here ---
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Table 1 shows the distribution of candidates by residence, using the contiguity
coding, in these 626 EDs.
--- Table 1 about here ---
Table 1 illustrates higher levels of local candidates amongst Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats – above 86 percent in both cases – with UKIP almost 10 percent
lower, as a newer party recruiting a candidate base.
The conditional logit model itself is a discrete choice model which is a variant of
multinomial logistic regression, and allows the inclusion of so-called ‘alternative-
specific’ variables which test their effect on a set of choices that each respondent
has to pick between. There are as many observations per individual respondent as
there are valid alternatives – in this case, four. In our model, controlling for standard
explanations of vote such as party feeling (a 0-10 thermometer score for each of the
parties by respondent, acting as an instrument to pick up their normal vote) and party
incumbency, we test how the independent effect of distance on vote for one of the
four party choices.8
Analysis
Table 2 presents the different specifications of the distance model.
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---Table 2 about here---
Model 0 is an empty model simply controlling for party. As compared with the
baseline Labour party, Conservatives and UKIP enjoy a higher likelihood of support,
the Liberal Democrats a deficit, reflecting the overall outcome of the Council
elections, and expectations of support in non-metropolitan counties. In Model 1, the
inclusion of the incumbent and party feeling thermometers washes out the party
effects, most notably in the case of the Conservatives for whom incumbency in
particular characterised more than half of the electoral divisions in the sample (see
Table 3 below). Straight-line distance follows the expected direction, with greater
distance resulting in lower likelihood of vote. Similarly, the home-division measure
sees greater support for candidates standing in their own electoral division. However,
there is no evidence of a significant contiguity effect – whilst there is a significant
difference between home and non-contiguous electoral divisions, this is no greater
than that with a neighbouring electoral division. Voters are concerned by the location
of a candidate outside the ED, but not where outside. As the BIC demonstrates, this
measure of distance results in the least powerful model of the three.
---Tables 3 and 4 about here---
Conditional logit coefficients give a sense of the effect of variables, but do not lend
themselves easily to real-world implications of distance. Tables 3 and 4 provide a
simulation of the effects of distance and of home ED residence, respectively, on
12
each of the parties’ candidates, and how different scenarios play out in terms of
voting support. The first three lines give the average observed score on the party
thermometers, either the average distance from candidate to voter (Table 3) or the
proportion of candidates living in their contested ED (Table 4) for the parties, and the
proportion of incumbent candidates. The ‘Real’ line gives the expected probabilities
of vote for the four parties. In both tables, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat
scores are very close to the observed values. The Labour score is somewhat under
the observed vote, presumably because of low incumbency in council seats.
Conversely, the UKIP score is much higher than observed, given the higher average
party feeling score. An even higher expected score is dampened by the higher
average distance that UKIP candidates live from voters.
Turning to the simulations using straight-line distance, relatively small shifts in
distance produce notable changes in the vote share. For scenario 1, all candidates
are assumed to live at 5.1km (the average observed distance across all candidates
and voters) from the voter. The vote distributions change very little, with the only
climb in vote share being for the UKIP candidate, again who on average live further
away than their mainstream party counterparts. Scenarios 2 through 5 then keep all
but one candidate at 5.1km, in turn moving one candidate to 20km away (the
candidate moved to 20km is given in bold).
In interpreting the distance effects, we need to bear in mind that the main effects
logit model constrains the effect of distance to be the same across all parties – the
observed differences are due to the differing baseline probabilities for each party.9
Consequently, in this election, the biggest losers from distant candidates are the
Conservatives, with an eight per cent loss – and UKIP benefits slightly more from
this loss than the other parties do. For UKIP, the move to 20km results in a similarly
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large loss to it. Labour and the Lib Dems, starting from a lower electoral score, lose
less in real terms from a non-local candidate. Probably the most striking finding is
that distance can reduce UKIP support to that of the Liberal Democrats – the
geographical structure of competition would be sufficient to prevent the Liberal
Democrats being pushed down the party rankings into fourth place on the popular
vote, as occurred in 2013 for this sample. The home ED simulations in Table 4 show
similar relative shifts, although less pronounced, with a Conservative candidate
outside the ED losing around five per cent when pitched against other home ED
candidates.
Conclusion
Distance matters for County Council elections. There is evidence that voters view
representatives at the local level in terms of whether they are ‘from here’ or ‘from
elsewhere’. But the notion of distance goes beyond that – the further away
candidates are, the less appealing they are to voters, other things being equal.
Voters do not appear to be distinguishing between neighbouring EDs and those that
are non-contiguous – indeed, dependent on the EDs in question, a neighbouring
Division may be further away than some non-contiguous counterparts. Instead, rising
distance matters whatever the location, and given the small size of County Council
EDs, that distance does not need to be large to put a candidate outside the voter’s
community.
Further study of how voters conceptualise their political geographical space would
help provide a theoretically solid idea of whether distance matters more as a scale or
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as a categorical location. Our conclusions here are drawn solely from what we
observe in the analysis. A larger sample might have allowed us to test both distance
and contiguity categories simultaneously.10 A comparative study of distance effects
across EDs with different two- and three-party competition would also allow a better
understanding of how supply mitigates or accentuates distance.
Compared with the General Election test, the effect of localness (whether distance or
categorical) appears stronger. Of course, this could be a reflection of the larger
distances involved in Westminster constituencies, with voters accepting less physical
proximity for representatives standing for large territorial units. Nevertheless, the
literature to date has underlined the likelihood of distance mattering more for sub-
national ballots, and so to find this at least confirmed suggests that the distance
effect spotted in the 2010 General Election analysis is less likely to have been by
chance. Further analysis of the two elections, for example including UKIP in the
choice-set for 2010, as well as of the forthcoming 2015 General Elections, will
provide the opportunity for a further proof of concept.
Finally, the better quality data from the County Council survey now allows us to
investigate some of the assumptions we needed to make to operationalize the model
in 2010. For example, the assumption that ward centroids could be used as an
estimate of voter location can now be tested at least indirectly by overlaying
Westminster constituencies on the County Council voter sample, to allow a test of
the distribution of residual distances between voter address and the relevant ward
centroid.
Overall, then, a relatively under-studied set of sub-national elections provide a very
useful case for retesting the localness hypothesis, and given the circumstances
15
particular to 2013, to expand upon previous analyses to include minor parties such
as UKIP. The analytical importance of distance in models of voting continues to
make a case for itself.
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Notes
1 Sizes calculated using OS Boundary-Line™ data. County Council Electoral
Divisions cover all non-metropolitan counties in England. Westminster divisions
include all 632 British constituencies.
2 Requirements are flexible for land occupation and residency, including occupancy
of premises such as a tent or house-boat. Electoral Commission, ‘Local elections
in England and Wales: guidance for candidates and agents’,
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/141784/Part-
1-Can-you-stand-for-election-LGEW.pdf
3 For the first time in 2010, candidates could opt to provide only the constituency in
which they lived on the Statement of Persons Nominated and the ballot paper.
4 Strictly speaking, the postcode covers a small area rather than a pinpoint location.
In terms of widely available location that can reasonably be included in a large-n
survey, this is still the most precise unit of observation, however.
5 We tested three specifications of the model using straight-line distance, driving
distance and driving time. As the correlation between all three was very high – no
lower than for 0.95 for any pair-wise test – we report the straight-line distance
model, which is the simplest to calculate using eastings and northings in standard
GIS packages.
6 EDs with more than one seat up for election could not be included as the vote
indicated by the survey respondent could not be identified as being cast for one
specific candidate, ballots including candidates for both seats simultaneously.
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7 A log-transformed measure accounting for the right skew in distance, which
produces essentially identical results to the linear measure used here, is
discussed and reported in the appendix (Table 2A).
8 We also tested social deprivation as a possible influence on vote choice that might
correlate spuriously with distance and vote choice. However, as with the General
Election model, there was no effect discernible, so we exclude this in the reported
model. Other possible controls, such as ‘distance from contention’, could be used
(Fisher et al, 2014).
9 To test for differential distance effects by party, we ran an alternative specification
including a party-distance interaction effect which is reported and discussed in the
appendix in Table 2A. The only evidence of a differential effect was for UKIP. We
also tested for interactions between party and home ED, and party and party
feeling, but there was no evidence of any effect here. The replication .do file
contains the syntax for all these first-order models.
10 Fractional polynomial models of distance should allow us to identify a more
complicated distance effect which, for example, plateaus after a certain distance
away is reached. Specifications using this which we have run so far do not
indicate any such non-linear effect.
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Tables
Table 1 Location of candidates across four-party competitive non-metropolitan County
Electoral Divisions (ED)
The table entries give the proportions of candidates of the four main parties by their
residential location relative to the Electoral Division they are contesting (e.g. ‘Home ED’
indicates a candidate who is contesting the ED they live in).
% Conservative LibDem UKIP Labour TOTAL
Non-
neighbouring
ED
13.26 13.58 22.20 16.93 16.49
Neighbouring
ED
29.87 35.30 27.80 31.95 31.23
Home ED 56.87 51.12 50.00 51.12 52.28
Total 100.00
(626)
Chi-square: 29.28 (6df), p < .001
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Table 2 Conditional logit estimates of party support in 2013 County Council elections in
England.
The table entries provide the conditional logit regression coefficients (robust standard errors
in parentheses) and significance levels for the three specifications of candidate location.
Model 0 Model I Model II Model III
Conservatives .250**
(.083)
-.177
(.149)
-.176
(.149)
-.176
(.148)
Lib Dems -.237*
(.094)
.232*
(.129)
.231*
(.129)
.218*
(.126)
UKIP .128
(.079)
.163
(.117)
.165
(.118)
.197*
(.117)
Party feeling (0-10) - .552***
(.022)
.552***
(.022)
.554***
(.022)
Incumbency - .806***
(.113)
.804***
(.112)
.800***
(.111)
Straight-line
distance (km)
- - - -.026***
(.008)
Home ED - .242**
(.094)
.260*
(.137)
-
Neighbour ED - - .026
(.138)
-
(Non-neighbour ED) - - - -
Pseudo-R2 .011 .491 .491 .492
BIC 3701.3 1944.2 1952.8 1939.3
N 5353
* p < 0.1; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
Note: all explanatory variables (except party controls) are alternative-specific, having
separate values for each party and therefore including multiple observations per respondent
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Table 3 Simulations of variations in candidate distance on vote share (%)
The table provides simulations of the estimated scores for each of the four parties according
to five scenarios which vary the respective distance of the party candidates to a notional
voter, to estimate the relative effect of distance for each.
Conservative LibDem UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0-
10)
5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Straight-line
distance (km)
4.27 4.78 7.00 4.73
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Real a 34.26 20.03 29.79 15.92
Scenario 1 33.37 19.77 31.16 15.69
Scenario 2 25.34 22.15 34.92 17.58
Scenario 3 35.64 14.31 33.29 16.76
Scenario 4 37.10 21.98 23.47 17.45
Scenario 5 35.15 20.82 32.82 11.20
a Expected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates at 5.1km from notional voter
Scenario 2 – bold candidate share moved to 20km from voter
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Table 4 Simulations of variations in candidate location on vote share (%)
The table provides simulations of the estimated scores for each of the four parties according
to five scenarios which vary the respective location (contesting their Home Electoral Division
or not) of the party candidates to a notional voter, to estimate the relative effect of location
for each.
Conservative LibDem UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0-
10)
5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Home ED 57.4% 52.0% 46.0% 53.5%
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Real a 34.08 20.23 29.83 15.86
Scenario 1 33.67 20.24 30.28 15.82
Scenario 2 28.50 21.82 32.64 17.05
Scenario 3 35.19 16.62 31.65 16.53
Scenario 4 36.00 21.65 25.43 16.92
Scenario 5 34.85 20.95 31.34 12.86
a Expected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates live in home ED
Scenario 2 – bold candidate moved to another ED; others remain in home ED
24
Figure 1 Sampled non-metropolitan counties with number of voters per electoral division
The map summarises the distribution of the sampled voters by Electoral Division across the
English counties analysed. Darker shaded areas indicate larger numbers of voters, with a
maximum of 9 voters in the darkest.
Note: white areas – not sampled; darker areas = larger number of voters (up to 9).
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Appendix
A standard approach to linear distance is to log-transform it before inclusion in a
model, to correct for the right skew inheritant in a measure lower bounded by 0. The
use of postcodes in our model to estimate distance produces a small number of
respondents with 0 distance, where the respondent lives in the same postcode as
one of the candidates. Because ln(0) is undefined, we add 25 metres to 0, being half
the observed smallest distance, and intuitively a realistic estimate of distance
between two houses on a street. The resultant model IIIA is reported in Table 2A.
We report this here, and retain the linear distance in the main paper, as the models
are functionally identical and linear distance does not require an ad hoc correction.
Model IV reports the linear distance model with an added party interaction term to
examine whether distance affects the four parties’ candidates differentially. There is
no evidence of differential effect for the three mainstream parties, but there is some
evidence of a dampening effect for UKIP in this election. To understand the effect
this has, Table 3A reports the simulations including the interaction effect. The
change in UKIP vote as the candidate is moved 20km away is notably smaller than
for other parties (and simultaneously the Labour effect increases significantly). We
present this as tentative evidence that UKIP candidates in 2013 were less affected
by distance as a ‘protest’ alternative to the mainstream. However, we would
encourage caution in this interpretation, given the risk of retrospective overfitting for
a single election.
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Table 2A Conditional logit estimates of party support in 2013 County Council elections in
England [alternative specifications]
The table entries provide the conditional logit regression coefficients (robust standard errors
in parentheses) and significance levels for the two alternative specifications of candidate
location, using log-distance (rather than linear distance) and including a partyXdistance
interaction term.
Model IIIA
(log-distance)
Model IV
(first-order party-
distance interaction)
Conservatives -.163
(.148)
-.282
(.175)
Lib Dems .221*
(.127)
.165
(.164)
UKIP .182
(.116)
-.074
(.151)
Party feeling (0-10) .553***
(.022)
.555***
(.023)
Incumbency .802***
(.112)
.786***
(.115)
Log-distance
Distance
-.132**
(.043)
-
-
-.060***
(.020)
ConservativesXDistance
LibDemsXDistance
UKIPXDistance
-
-
-
.028
(.027)
.014
(.025)
.054*
(.022)
Pseudo-R2 .492 .495
BIC 1941.3 1956.0
N 5353
* p < 0.1; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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Table 3A Simulations of variations in candidate distance on vote share [alternative
specification including party-distance interactions] (%)
The table provides alternative simulations, including the party-distance interaction term from
Model IV, of the estimated scores for each of the four parties according to five scenarios
which vary the respective distance of the party candidates to a notional voter, to estimate the
relative effect of distance for each.
Conservative LibDem UKIP Labour
Party feeling (0-
10)
5.36 4.29 5.50 4.55
Straight-line
distance (km)
4.27 4.78 7.00 4.73
Incumbent 66.0% 25.4% 0.8% 5.1%
Real a 34.43 19.87 30.06 15.64
Scenario 1 33.91 19.80 30.81 15.47
Scenario 2 24.14 22.73 35.37 17.76
Scenario 3 37.64 11.00 34.19 17.17
Scenario 4 34.96 20.41 28.68 15.95
Scenario 5 37.34 21.80 33.93 6.93
a Expected probabilities of party vote conditional on the distribution of the explanatory variables.
Scenario 1 – all candidates at 5.1km from notional voter
Scenario 2 – bold candidate share moved to 20km from voter
